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Abstract
This paper estimates the effect of access to transportation networks on regional eco-
nomic outcomes in China over a twenty-period of rapid income growth. It addresses
the problem of the endogenous placement of networks by exploiting the fact that these
networks tend to connect historical cities. Our results show that proximity to trans-
portation networks have a moderate positive causal effect on per capita GDP levels
across sectors, but no effect on per capita GDP growth. We provide a simple the-
oretical framework with empirically testable predictions to interpret our results. We
argue that our results are consistent with factor mobility playing an important role in
determining the economic benefits of infrastructure development.
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“A key issue [on whether railroads benefit economic development], however, is
whether such railroad influence was primarily exogenous or endogenous, whether
railroads first set in motion the forces culminating in the economic development
of the decade, or whether arising in response to profitable situations, they played
a more passive role.” – Albert Fishlow, American Railroads and the Transfor-
mation of the Ante-bellum Economy, 1965 pp. 203
1 Introduction
Transportation infrastructure is often mentioned as a key to promoting growth and develop-
ment. The argument relies on the simple logic that one first needs to have access to markets
and ideas before one can benefit from them. This belief is supported by the observation
that the historical construction of infrastructure such as railroads coincided with periods of
rapid economic growth in Western Europe, Japan and the United States. Today, it is in-
disputable that richer countries have dramatically better transportation infrastructure than
poorer ones. However, policymakers considering the trade-offs of investing in infrastructure
must consider several related questions. First, they must consider the question of causality:
is infrastructure development a worthwhile object of policy, or is it better to rely on the
natural forces of the market and/or competition between local jurisdictions to endogenously
provide the necessary infrastructure when the demand is there? For example, Fogel (1962,
1964) famously argues that one of the most frequently mentioned historical innovations in
transportation infrastructure, railroads, was less effective for economic development in the
United States than the pre-existing river networks and that this misdirected investment was
a result of government policies for promoting railroads.
Second, policymakers are typically concerned about the distributional effects of infras-
tructure, which are by no means obvious. On the one hand, for fixed factor endowments, the
increased access to markets and ideas should benefit all regions. For example, in the histori-
cal context of the United States, it has been argued that transportation infrastructure gives
rise to more cities, which then turned into “engines” of growth for the country as a whole.1
1For example, see the World Bank’s World Development Report 2009 on Reshaping Economic Geography
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On the other hand, transportation infrastructure increases the access of rural regions to
cities, and the well-known agglomeration effects of cities may cause productive capital and
skilled labor to move from rural regions to cities over time, with the result that those who
remain in rural areas receive very limited benefits from urbanization or even become impov-
erished. Along similar lines, it has been argued that the expansion of motor road networks
in the United States promoted large-scale suburbanization and left many cities without a
viable economic model (Glaeser and Gottlieb, 1999).
This paper makes progress in understanding the impact of access to transportation in-
frastructure by examining the causal effect of access on economic performance in different
regions in China during a twenty-year period of rapid growth. We ask the straightforward
question: Do areas that are “quasi-randomly” assigned to have better access to transporta-
tion networks consequently have better economic outcomes in the long run? Specifically, we
attempt to empirically examine two closely related questions. First, we ask whether access
to better transportation enriches the average region that is affected (because it draws in or
generates more new economic activities) or impoverishes it (because it becomes easier for
human and physical capital to exit). Second, we ask whether areas that have better access
to transportation networks benefit much more and serve as engines of growth when new
economic opportunities arise and growth becomes possible.
For our discussion, it is important to keep three points in mind. First, our focus is on
long term effects. We are interested not just in the impact on trade and prices that result
from greater access, which tends to be relatively short-term, but also in the subsequent
changes in the patterns of localization of economic activity as people and factories relocate.
Second, the emphasis on understanding the effect of infrastructure for the average location
is crucial to our study since it is entirely possible that some of the largest cities benefit from
infrastructure through greater concentration of resources while most other places lose out.
Finally, there cannot be one definitive answer to these questions, since the answer will clearly
depend on the starting point – i.e. the first road to connect the agricultural hinterland to a
port is very different from the fifth such road.
by Aoyama and Horner (2009) for a nuanced statement of this view.
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We use county-level economic data from China to try to answer these questions. In many
ways, China offers an ideal setting for our work. In the late 19th and early 20th century,
the Chinese government and a set of Western Colonial powers built railroads connecting
the historical cities of China to each other and to the newly constructed so-called “Treaty
Ports”.2 We identify our average “treated” areas to be those that were close to the straight
line connecting the same set of cities. Our analysis excludes the termini cities, where there
are obviously additional termini effects. Our strategy compares areas closer to the lines
to areas further away and interpret the result of this comparison as the overall effect of
any transportation infrastructure – the original railroads and any other infrastructure later
added – along these historical transportation corridors.
This strategy has a number of advantages. First, it provides us with an exogenous source
of variation in access to transportation networks. Second, this variation goes back to at least
fifty years before our study begins in 1986, by which time the patterns of economic activity
would have had ample chance to relocate. We can therefore ask what the long run level
effect of being close to the line (and hence to transportation) was, say around 1986. Third,
our study period, 1986-2006, coincides with China’s opening up and subsequent growth
acceleration. Our treatment areas were in a very good position to take the lead in exploiting
these new opportunities. We therefore also study growth effects of being close to the line
over the period 1986-2003.
The results show that being close to the line had a positive level effect. Per capita
GDP was higher in places closer to the line. However the effect is not large. The elastic-
ity of per capita GDP with respect to distance from historical transportation networks is
approximately -0.07. The lack of a large level effect is consistent with independent data
from a higher-quality household survey, the National Fixed Point Survey (NFS) collected
by the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture, which shows that distance has no significant effect
on household income. This might reflect the effects of the two contending forces that we
discussed earlier. For the estimates of the effect of proximity on growth, we find a precisely
estimated zero effect. The estimated elasticity between distance to the line and annual per
2For example, see Pong (1973).
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capita GDP growth is -0.002 and statistically insignificant (the standard error is 0.003).
Places close to the line grew exactly as fast as places further away.
Our finding that better access to transportation networks does not have a large impact on
the (relative) economic performance of those areas is consistent with the Fogelian view that
transportation infrastructure by itself does not really do very much, excepting perhaps where
there was already a demand for it. Based on similar logic, China scholars have criticized
public investment in transportation infrastructure in China after 1990 (Huang, 2008).
However, in the interest of understanding the potential benefits and limitations of in-
frastructural investment in developing countries more fully, we also consider an alternative
and complimentary interpretation. We ask whether there are any obvious characteristics
of China (or developing countries in general) that could cause the measured benefits of in-
frastructure to be small even if better transportation causes substantial gains to GDP. In
particular, our model emphasizes the role of factor mobility – i.e., labor is assumed to be
completely immobile, while capital is assumed to move at a cost. Using a simple model, we
argue that the empirical evidence is consistent with a version of the model where capital
is less mobile than goods such that even distant places retain high levels of capital. The
result is that the level differences in productivity will tend to be relatively small and both
near and far places will be involved in the production of exports. This, in turn, means (in
the world of our model) that both locations will gain equally in proportional terms from
China’s integration into world markets. Therefore, even though better transportation does
help China as a whole to gain more from trade, GDP level differences between well- and
poorly connected areas can be small and there may be no differences in growth rates between
the two areas.
The premise of this model is, as we emphasized above, that goods move more easily
than capital. Unfortunately we cannot directly observe the relative mobility of goods and
capital. However, our model tells us that relatively low mobility of capital is likely to be
associated with a situation, where there is higher inequality in better connected areas, under
the assumption that the direction of capital movement is from less connected areas towards
better connected ones. Using regional income inequality data computed from the National
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Fixed Point Survey collected by China’s Ministry of Agriculture (1987-2005), we do find
that inequality is higher in better connected areas.
In assessing what general lessons one can learn from our results, one should consider
whether our results and theory are driven by conditions specific to the Chinese context.
For example, one may be concerned that the marginal effect of access to infrastructure is
especially low in China due to the massive investment into infrastructure during recent years
on the part of the government.3 We believe that this is highly unlikely to be driving our
results because our data shows large variation in access to infrastructure. In our data, the
distance to the railroad for the counties that are the nearest the line (defined as the nearest
decile) are only a third of the distance for those that are the furthest (defined as the furthest
decile). Similarly, the nearest counties have more than twice the length of highway relative
to the furthest counties (despite the fact that the latter are almost eight times as large in
area).
Another concern for external validity is that the lack of factor mobility stems from the
Chinese government’s attempts to control labor mobility and that the empirical findings are
not easily generalizable to the context of other developing countries.4 We acknowledge that
the Chinese government may be unique in implementing an explicit policy for controlling
migration for so long. However, it is important to note that the actual patterns of low levels
of migration are not unique to China. In particular, the main policy effort has focused on
unskilled low-wage rural workers (Meng, 2005), a group that has been found to be relatively
immobile in other contexts such as India (Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2009). Moreover, the
theory predicts similar effects regardless of which factor (e.g., labor, capital) is immobile
and the immobility of capital has been documented in several developing country contexts.5
A growing number of recent papers have developed compelling identification strategies to
evaluate the impact of transportation infrastructure (e.g., Michaels, 2008; Donaldson, 2010;
Keller and Shiue, 2008).6 These studies examine the effect of transportation infrastructure
3For example, see Huang (2008) for a discussion on infrastructure investment in recent years in China.
4For example, see West and Zhao (2000) for a review of studies on labor migration.
5For example, see Duflo (2004) for evidence of limited capital mobility within Indonesia.
6Michaels (2008) examines the effect of highway construction in the United States in the 1950s, using
both a difference-in-difference (DD) approach and an instrumental variables approach, where he exploits the
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from the point of view of market integration and the focus is on price convergence and
changes in the relative price of factors along the lines predicted by trade models. The
results suggest that transportation infrastructure favors greater price convergence and that
factor prices shift in the direction predicted by trade theory.
Our study differs from earlier studies in its focus on the longer-run and more macro
question: do areas that benefit from access to the reduction in trade costs and perhaps
other costs become wealthier as a consequence? This is by no means obvious even if there
is clear evidence that trade and other flows such as migration increased when infrastructure
became available. Our estimates provide a much more reduced form effect, which presumably
includes not just the possible gains from more efficient trade but also the effects of greater
factor mobility, better access to education, health care and finance, and other, more diffuse,
effects coming from the diffusion of ideas, technologies, etc. Along these lines, our study is
more closely related to Atack et al. (2009), which finds that access to railroads has a strong
positive effect on urbanization but a small effect on population growth in the United States.
Similarly, in a study contemporaneous to ours, Faber (2009) uses a straight-line instrument
to study the impact of recently constructed highways in China on economic performance.7
Moreover, our paper provides a potential interpretation of the lack of infrastructure
effects which is of some independent interest. The idea that the lack of factor mobility might
limit the impact of better infrastructure is of considerable relevance to many developing
countries that are currently investing in improving their infrastructure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We start with a brief review of the literature
in Section 2. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework that we use to think about
our results including a simple model of industrial location choice. Section 4 provides the
background and the empirical strategy. Section 5 describes the data. Section 6 presents the
variation in access caused by the fact that highways tended to be built in either a North-South direction or
an East-West direction starting from big cities. Donaldson (2010) studies the effects of railroad construction
in 19th century India using a DD approach. Keller and Shiue (2008) uses a similar strategy to examine the
opening up of railways between regions within Germany.
7While Atack et al. (2009) primarily uses a DD approach, it also constructs an instrument for the distance
to the railroad based on the straight line between the start and end points of a railway line. Similarly, Faber
(2009) both uses a straight-line instrument as well as estimates of transportation costs for exogenous variation
in access to transportation. Both studies generously credit the straight-line instrument to an earlier version
of our paper (Banerjee et al., 2004).
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results. Section 7 offers concluding remarks.
2 Growth, Capital and Mobility
This section briefly discusses factor mobility in China in the aspects that relate to the
simple model we present in the next section. We aim to make three points. First, central
planning policies caused the endowment of human and physical capital to be higher in
urban areas relative to rural areas in the pre-reform era (1949-76). However, to promote
rural industrialization, the pre-reform government also invested high quantities of capital in
rural areas (Unger, 2002). Second, restrictions on migration largely prohibit the mobility of
unskilled labor during the post-reform period of our study and limited financial development
probably did inhibit capital mobility (West and Zhao, 2000). Finally, the post-reform era
was characterized by very high growth rates.8
Chinese central planners have always focused on economic growth and industrialization.
In the early 1950s, this meant moving skilled workers and machines into cities. During
this period, the percentage of government revenues used to fund industrial development
increased from 32% in 1952 to 57% in 1957 (Eckstein, 1977). Much emphasis was also put
into improving human capital in cities. In addition to moving skilled workers into cities, a
special emphasis was put on secondary and higher education. Note that all secondary and
higher education institutions in China are located in cities. This naturally causes human
capital to be drawn into cities even if some of the students were born in rural areas.
Rural areas also received investment, albeit less than the cities. An enormous number
of primary schools were established so that all rural children will have access to a basic
education. Literacy rates in China reportedly improved from less than 20% in 1949 to 68%
by 1982, even though almost 80% of the population was still rural (Jowett, 1989). Rural
areas also received investments in physical capital: villages were collectivized and physical
capital was owned and managed by collectives. When China de-collectivized during the
early 1980s, collective assets were inherited by villages, and were often used to form Town
and Village Enterprises (TVE). The ownership structure of TVEs are peculiar to China.
8See, for example, Hu et al. (1997) for an overview of Chinese growth.
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For our study, it is important to note the following facts. First, a significant proportion
of industrial output in China during our study period came from TVEs. As a percentage
of national industrial output, output from TVEs grew from 9% in 1978 to 36% in 1993.9
Second, TVE assets are jointly owned by all community residents, which were approxi-
mately 400 households in an average village and 3,500 households in an average township.
Households owned equal shares in TVEs and it was illegal to sell or transfer their shares
to non-community members. Third, the law required that at least 60% of the profits be
retained in the village.10 The data show that over half of the profits were re-invested.11
These three facts together suggest that a significant amount of productive capital was in
rural areas, and policy both prevented their mobility to cities and promoted further capital
accumulation in rural areas.
Labor mobility was also restricted. If a worker moved without official permission, she
lost access to all public goods. For urban residents, this meant losing access to schools,
healthcare, and during the 1980s and early 90s, it also meant the loss of food rations and
housing. For rural residents, this meant the loss of farmland. Government permission was
easier to obtain for skilled workers such as college graduates who could obtain jobs that
assisted them in getting the permission to relocate or workers with skills that are needed in
specific industries such as construction during the mid- and late- 1990s. But for the rest of
the population, permission was extremely difficult to obtain (e.g., Meng, 2005; Meng and
Kidd, 1997). Therefore, while the number of migrant workers increased greatly during this
period, most of them were temporary migrants who maintained their original residences.12
Finally, it is important to point out the differences in growth rates between cities and
rural areas and how they changed over time in China during the post-Mao reform era, when
income increased rapidly for the country. During the first years of the period, 1978-84,
the real income of rural residents grew at 17.7% per year while it was only 7.9% for urban
residents. This pattern was reversed in the mid-1980s and the urban advantage increased
9See the Statistical Material of Township and Enterprises, 1992.
10See Articles 18 and 32 in The Regulation on Township and Village Collective Enterprises of the People’s
Republic of China (1990).
11See Statistical Survey of China, 1992: pp. 67.
12There has been numerous studies on migration in China. Zhao (1999) provides a survey of recent
evidence.
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steadily for the remainder of the reform era. On average, rural real income growth rates
declined to only 4.1% while urban real income growth was approximately 6.6% (Cai, 2010).
3 Conceptual Framework
There are a number of reasons why good transportation infrastructure can be advantageous
for economic development. First, it plausibly reduces trade costs and promotes market
integration. This should lead to a convergence in prices, reduce price volatility and reallocate
resources along the lines of comparative advantage. It also increases market size, which
allows firms to capture gains from increasing returns and promotes more intense competition.
Second, it promotes factor mobility – e.g., it is easier to migrate to the city if one can return
easily whenever needed; easier to lend to a borrower whose project you can visit; and easier
to deposit your savings in a bank if the bank is more accessible. Third, it is easier to take
advantage of opportunities for investment in human capital – e.g., you can send your child
to a better school or take him to a better doctor. Finally, there are intangible benefits. For
example, freer movement of people and goods may bring with it new aspirations, new ideas
and information about new technologies.
3.1 A simple model of trade and factor mobility
The goal of the model is to look at the effects of distance in a setting where distance affects
both the mobility of goods and that of factors of production. The model will illustrate how
access to infrastructure can produce very different results depending on which of the two is
more affected by distance.
3.1.1 Building blocks
There are M + N + 1 regions in this economy: M distant regions, N connected regions
and 1 metropolis. Each region produces one good exclusively for export which could be the
same as or different from the goods that it imports (e.g. food), and another good which
it consumes. These goods could be either identical or differentiated. The key assumption
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is that the relative price of the exportable in terms of the importable good in the “world
market” is the same, p. However, distance to the market adds to the cost. We model this by
assuming that this transportation cost is increasing in distance from the market such that
the price received by the exporters is p in the metropolis, p(1− d1) in the connected region
and p(1 − d2) in the distant regions, where d2 > d1.
Production is carried out by a population of firms of identical size in each region. Pro-
duction requires two inputs which we will call labor and capital, but could also be labor
and human capital with small adjustments in the arguments. Output of the exportable is
given by AKαL1−α(K)β everywhere, where K is the average level of K in firms in that
region.13 In other words, in the urban economics tradition, we allow for spillovers from co-
location. However, we assume that the spillovers are not so large as to swamp diminishing
returns entirely: α + β < 1.14 Assume for the time being that there is no other technology
of production.
The key assumption is with respect to factor mobility. We assume that labor does not
move: The metropolis has an endowment of labor of L∗ while all other regions have an
endowment of L′. Capital, on the other hand, does move, but moving is costly. We assume
that in equilibrium, the direction of movement that would be needed is from the various
regions to the metropolis. This is consistent with the view that in the initial years of Chinese
growth after 1978, much of the growth and capital accumulation occurred in rural areas,
and it was only later that economic freedoms were extended to urban areas and the urban
growth rate crossed its rural counterpart. Therefore, when the rental rate for capital in the
metropolis is r, we assume that the opportunity cost of capital in the connected regions is
r(1 − ρd1) and that in the distant regions, is r(1 − ρd2). In other words, the further one is,
the more it costs her to send capital to the metropolis. Therefore, she is willing to accept
a lower return on capital if it is invested in her own region (e.g., because she can monitor
the borrower more easily).15 We assume that there are no other constraints on mobility (no
13We could easily let A vary across the locations to captures differences in the flow of ideas.
14See Duranton and Puga (2004) for a review of this literature.
15The equivalent assumption for human capital would be that there is a cost to relocating from one’s home
region to the city, but the cost is lower if she is better connected (e.g., because it is easier to travel to and
fro).
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within-region credit constraints for example).
3.1.2 Analysis of the basic model
Analysis of this model is straightforward. Profit maximization with respect to the inputs
yields the generic conditions:
w = p(1 − d)A(1 − α)(K
L
)α(K)β and (1)
r(1 − ρd) = p(1 − d)Aα( L
K
)1−α(K)β,
where w is the wage rate in that type of region, L is the labor endowment, K is the
equilibrium amount of capital invested in a firm in that region and d is the corresponding
distance variable (d = 0 for the metropolis, d = d1 for the connected regions and d = d2 for
the distant regions). In addition, there is the capital market clearing condition:
MKD +NKC +KM = K, (2)
where KD is the average amount of capital used in the distant region (per firm), KC is the
same thing in a connected region and KM is that in the metropolis. K is the total supply
of capital in the economy.
Manipulating the capital demand condition and using the fact K = K and L = L′
outside the metropolis yields
K1−α−β =
p(1 − d)
r(1 − ρd)Aα(L
′)1−α, (3)
which tells us that whether the distant regions or the connected have more capital per firm
depends on whether the ratio (1−d)(1−ρd) is increasing or decreasing in d. If ρ > 1, which is
the case where capital is less mobile than goods, then the distant region will actually have
more capital per worker. Using the wage-rental ratio as the measure of inequality, as is
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conventional in trade models, we see that
w
r(1 − ρd) =
(1 − α)(KL′ )
Aα
. (4)
It follows directly that inequality is higher wherever K is lower. In other words, if capital
is less mobile than goods, then the more distant region would have less inequality because
it is able to retain more of its capital. A similar result would hold if we replaced capital by
human capital and used the skill premium to measure inequality.
Finally, we compare outputs per worker/capita,
y = p(1 − d)A(( 1
L′
)α(K)α+β, (5)
which can be written as
y = p(1 − d)A(( 1
L′
)α(
p(1 − d)
r(1 − ρd)Aα(L
′)1−α)
α+β
1−α−β . (6)
In the case where ρ < 1, this expression is clearly decreasing in d since both the p(1 − d)
term and the p(1−d)r(1−ρd) term declines with d, but when ρ > 1, we might actually observe the
reverse, especially when spillovers are large (1−α− β is close to zero) and therefore α+β1−α−β
is large. Once again this is because the better connected region loses more of its capital.
Result 1: In the basic model, output per capita will always be higher and inequality lower
in the better connected region as long as capital is more mobile than goods. However when
capital is less mobile than goods, the more distant area will have less inequality and the
difference in per capita output between the regions will tend to be small and may even be
higher in the more distant region.
What is the effect of trade opening in this economy? If we model it as an increase in p,
the price of the exportable, it increases incomes everywhere at the same rate. The rate of
growth will not depend on the location.
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Result 2: In the basic model, the effect of trade opening would be to raise income levels
everywhere in proportion and hence have no differential growth effect.
3.1.3 A simple extension
The growth result here is somewhat of an artifact of the way the model is set up. Suppose
we add an alternative production technology that uses only labor and produces a perfect
substitute for the importable good (e.g. agriculture) using the technology x = BL , where
L is the labor input. The good is consumed in the location and does not need transporting.
The point is that now the wage in the exporting sector, w, needs to be bigger than B for
there to be production of exportable goods. In this model, there can be three types of
equilibria: type A, where both close and distant locations export; type B, where one of the
locations exports and the other does not; and type C, where neither exports. As long as
ρ < 1, we know that wages, which are proportional to output per capita, will be lower in
the more distant location, and therefore, if we are in case B, the distant location will not
export. It follows that as long as ρ < 1, the effect of trade opening will either be the same
in both areas (types A and C), or the more connected area will grow faster.
On the other hand, when ρ > 1, it is not clear which of the two locations will have lower
wages, and the gap between wages is likely to be small. Therefore we are more likely to be
in either type A or C equilibria. Given the high average growth rate of approximately 8%
in both close and far regions (see Table 2 column 3), scenario A seems more likely at least
for the present. This is consistent with the fact that China now has excellent infrastructure
and both near and far places are relatively easily accessed.16 In any case, in both type A
and type C equilibria, the effect of trade opening on growth rates is the same both in close
and distant places, unless the effect of the trade shock is just big enough to move one area
from not exporting to exporting but not the other.
16In the model, it is possible for even a very poorly connected area to export because we place no lower
bound on the interest rate. But if transportation is really expensive, the interest rate will have to be very
negative in the distant areas to permit exporting. It seems likely that capital owners will then prefer to hold
cash or gold and therefore, there will not be any exports.
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Result 3: In the model with “agriculture”, trade opening is likely to benefit the closer
area more in terms of growth rates as long as capital is more mobile than goods, but in the
reverse case, growth rates in both close and distant areas should react relatively similarly to
trade opening. Moreover, assuming that China is in a type A equilibrium, Result 1 should
continue to hold in this case.
To summarize, a pattern where inequality is higher in more connected areas, but output
level differences are small and growth rate differences are absent, is consistent with a setting
where capital is less mobile than goods. The lack of a differential growth effect in this
scenario is consistent with an overall beneficial effect of transportation infrastructure, which
is what allows both close and more distant areas to be exporting.
4 Historical Background and Empirical Strategy
4.1 The Birth of Modern Infrastructure
As explained above, the basic idea behind our empirical strategy is to examine the corre-
lation between the distance to the nearest straight line connecting two historical cities and
the outcomes of interest. Throughout the paper, we assert that these lines capture major
transportation networks during the 1980s because they capture the first modern infrastruc-
ture (e.g. railroads) built in China and much of the infrastructure development afterwards
began by initially building along these routes. Later in Section 6.4, we will provide evidence
for our assertion.
To draw the lines, we start with the set of important historical cities in China circa 1860:
Beijing, Taiyuan, Lanzhou, Xian, Chengdu, Guiyang, Kunming and Nanchang. These were
urban centers that were politically and economically important. To these we add the four
Treaty Ports that were set up by the League of Eight Nations after they defeated the Qing
government in the First Opium War in 1842 (Shanghai, Ningbo, Fuzhou and Guangzhou).
These four cities were chosen for their strategic locations. The “unequal treaties” that were
signed between China and the League of Eight Nations after the Opium Wars allowed the
Western countries to house their military in the Treaty Ports but not beyond. Therefore,
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these ports were chosen to be easily accessible by European ships and also to be strategically
advantageous for reaching Chinese cities in case of an uprising or war.
The four Treaty Ports in our sample are all along the coast or a major navigable river.
Shanghai and Ningbo are on the northern and southern mouth of the Yangtze River, Fuzhou
was on the southern coast of the Yellow Sea, and Guangzhou was on the Xi River, near its
mouth on the South China Sea. All of these ports were easily accessible by the naval gunships
of the Western countries and therefore allowed them to both impose their military presence
as well as control international trade with China.17 With the exception of Guangzhou, these
locations were villages and not prominent historical urban centers prior to becoming Treaty
Ports (such as Nanchang or Xian). Therefore, the lines that we draw between these Treaty
Ports and the historical Chinese cities have no reason to go through regions of particular
importance to the Chinese.
Moreover, it is important to point out that the Chinese were significantly behind the
Europeans in terms of naval technology in 1842, and did not possess a fleet of similar navel
gunships for which the Treaty Ports were chosen. More generally, China had conducted a
very limited amount of international trade since the 16th Century through the Ming and
Qing Dynasties. Similarly, it did not have an outgoing navy for several centuries leading
up to the Opium Wars.18 Therefore, places such as Shanghai, Ningbo and Fuzhou, while
not entirely uninhabited prior to 1842, were only rural agricultural areas with small stations
for domestic naval patrol boats. Their insignificance before 1842 is shown by the fact that
none of the four cities were connected to the Grand Canal, which was a north-south canal
built to connect Beijing to the important Southern cities. It follows then, that when we
draw lines to connect the Treaty Ports and historical Chinese cities, we are unlikely to be
systematically capturing important routes from before 1842. Instead, the lines will capture
modern transportation networks built afterwards.
17The Treaty Ports were established in Article 2 of The Treaty of Nanjing, which was signed between
the British and the Qing government. Article 2 requested the four cities we mention and Xiamen to be
established as Treaty Ports. But in practice, Xiamen did not receive significant investment from the West
and only became a Treaty Port during the second wave of Treaty Port Relinquishment by the Qing in 1865.
Therefore, in our line construction, we omit Xiamen. The other Treaty Ports of the second wave were
Tianjin, Niuzhang, Yantai, Zhenjiang, Hankou, Shantou, Taibei and Tainan (Spence, 1990; Pong).
18See Spence (1990, Ch. 2) for a detailed discussion of China during the 19th Century.
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The first and perhaps most important transportation infrastructure are railroads. They
were mostly built during the early 20th Century jointly by the Qing government and Western
countries. The latter provided much of the financing and had much influence over the
placement of the railroads. They were largely built to promote Western economic and
military interests in China and connected Treaty Ports to historical cities, and also connected
historical cities to Colonial cities outside of China. For example, the British planned and
financed railways to connect the Yangtze River valley as well as a north-south railway to
connect Wuhan to Guangzhou against the protest of the Qing government, who feared that
this would facilitate fast British troop deployment from Shanghai and Ningbo to important
Chinese cities. The French planned and financed a railway to connect Kunming to Hanoi,
an important city in French Indochina. The Russians planned a railway that was almost a
straight line from Beijing to Vladivostok through Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang provinces
(Spence, 1991: pp. 249-56).
4.2 Straight Lines
We construct our independent variable using a simple algorithm. We draw a straight line
from each historically important city to the nearest Treaty Port and/or to the nearest other
historically important city. If there are two cities (or ports) where the difference in distances
are less than 100km, we draw a line to both. The line is continued past the city until it
hits a natural barrier (e.g. Tibetan Plateau, coast line), or a border to another country. If
extended, many of these lines will reach important Colonial cities outside of China. They
lines are shown in Figure 1.
As expected, the lines drawn this way coincide well with railroads constructed during
the early 20th century.19 The three places where they do not match well are North-Western
China, where construction occurred under the Communist government after the 1970s, partly
as an attempt to politically integrate these areas into China; and North Eastern China
(Manchuria), where most of the construction was done by a de facto colonial Japanese
19While the railroads suffered much damage during World War II, after the war, the Guomingtang (KMT)
and then the Communist (post -1949) governments undertook extensive repairs and construction focused on
upgrading the physical structure. A comparison of maps from the 1930s to maps from the 1950s indicate
that they mostly did not alter the course of the railroads.
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government during the 1920-30s as part of their attempt to lay claims to these areas (Figure
1 shows that in Manchuria, most counties have a railroad). For this reason, our estimating
sample will exclude Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia and the provinces in Manchuria.
Our main source of plausibly exogenous variation for access to infrastructure is the
nearest distance from the center of each county to this straight line. The centroid of counties
are illustrated in Figure 1. Both the centroids and the nearest distance are computed by
ArcGIS using the Asia Conical Projection. We use geographic distance rather than travel
distance measured as kilometers. This line is also our proxy for transportation infrastructure.
To check that the lines do indeed proxy for transportation infrastructure, we estimate
the correlation between distance to the line and various measures of infrastructure using the
following equation:
Icpt = δlnLcp + ρp + γt + εcpt. (7)
Transportation infrastructure in county c in province p and year t, Icpt, is a function
of: the natural logarithm of the distance to the nearest line connection treaty ports and
historical cities illustrated in Figure 1, Lcp; province fixed effects, ρp; and year fixed effects
γt. Note that the fact that the line is likely to be corrected with many different types of
transportation infrastructure means that Lcp is not an excludable instrument for any given
infrastructure.
Our main estimating equation is the following:
ycpt = βlnLcp + ΓZcp + ρp + γt + εcpt. (8)
The outcome for county c, province p and year t, Ycpt, is a function of: the natural
logarithm of the shortest distance to the line for county c in province p, Lcp; a vector of
county-specific controls, Xcp; province fixed effects, ρp; and, year fixed effects, γt. The
standard errors are clustered at the county level. If proximity to the line is beneficial, then
βˆ < 0.
Interpreting β as the causal effect of proximity to the line assumes that the only difference
between places near the line and places further away is the distance to the line. This
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obviously relies on the terminal cities not being chosen so that the straight line between
them would run through economically important regions. This is the reason for why we
focus on the ancient cities of China and the Treaty ports – i.e., the historical cities are both
sufficiently far from each other and clearly more important than any place between them
in the historical era that it is easy to be comfortable with the identification assumption
in this context. Similarly, the Treaty Ports were chosen for their suitability for European
gunships rather than what laid between them and the historical cities. Note that we restrict
our attention to the first four Treaty Ports to avoid the potentially endogenous influences
of later Treaty Ports, which may have been chosen for economic reasons (e.g. proximity to
economically viable or prosperous regions).
There are two caveats. First, being closer to the line will by construction mean that a
county is also closer to the terminal cities. Therefore, our baseline specification will control
for distance to the terminal cities. Second, the line from some historically important cities to
a Treaty Port might follow along a river, an important traditional means for transportation
as well as an important input for agriculture (e.g., river beds provide fertile soils). In this
case, distance from our line will also capture the distance from the river, which presumably
captures many other effects. To address this, our baseline specifications always control for
distance to the nearest navigable river.
The baseline estimation also controls for other potentially influential factors, which we
will discuss and motivate later in the paper.
Note that it is not clear that we can expand the set of cities being connected (and
therefore use more of the data) without running into potential problems. One issue is that
of endogeneity raised earlier. Another equally important issue comes from the very nature
of the construction of lines. We compare places that are close to a line with those that are
further away. The implicit assumption is that moving further away from one line does not
bring us closer to a different line, a problem that occurs when there are too many lines. We
ensure this by having relatively few lines and using a sample of counties that are not too
distant from any line. The maximum distance of any county in our sample from the nearest
line will be 336 km. Figure 1 shows that there are only ten lines. We will return to discuss
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this further in Section 6.4.
5 Data
This paper uses data from multiple sources. All maps are obtained in digital format from the
Michigan China Data Center. Geographic measures are constructed using ArcGIS software,
assuming a Conical Projection. We define centroids of cities and counties. The lines are
constructed to connect the centroids of segment cities (using the algorithm described earlier).
We compute the nearest distance from each centroid to the straight line, railroads, navigable
rivers, the coastline, the country border and segment cities. Figure 1 displays a map of county
boundaries, their calculated centroids, our constructed lines, railways and major navigable
rivers. Since the road network in China is quite dense, the distance between an arbitrarily
defined centroid and the nearest road is not a meaningful measure of access to roads. Our
proxy for access to roads is instead the density of roads in each county. Since our regressions
will control for county area, we can control for road density by controlling for road length.
Therefore, we compute the length of highways (multi-lane highways) and paved roads (paved
motor-roads) in each county.
The first outcome measure we examine is county-level per capita GDP. These are from the
Provincial Statistical Yearbooks from China from 1986-2003 stored in the National Library in
Beijing, China. In 2004-6, we collected and digitized data from all published yearbooks that
reported county-level statistics on GDP. These data are interesting because they measure
production whereas previous studies have mainly focused on prices. However, there are
several problems with these data. First, GDP may have been measured using different
techniques across provinces and over time. To the extent that these changes are documented
or obvious (e.g., changes in the units of measurement), we have corrected for them. But this
is clearly still imperfect. Second, not all counties report GDP and those that are reported are
not a random sample of Chinese counties. Third, many counties do not consistently report
over time, which means that we have an unbalanced panel where attrition is non-random.
There is little documentation on the logic behind the decision of which counties report GDP
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and we can do little to correct for it. Our final sample is an unbalanced panel of 310 counties
within seventeen provinces.20 In addition to the data on GDP, we collected data on county
population so that we can calculate per capita GDP. Figure 2 maps the counties for which
we have GDP data.
To address these measurement difficulties, we supplement the analysis with two addi-
tional data sets of higher quality. While they cannot allow us to directly correct for the
county-level GDP data, they do allow us to check that the estimated effects in these two
alternative data sets are consistent to our theory. The first of these are firm-level data from
the Census of of Industrial Plants in 1993 and the Census of Manufacturing Firms during
2004-2006. We are able to geocode these data to the county level.21 The first survey includes
all industrial plants. The second survey samples all manufacturing firms in China that have
market capitalization of five million RMBs or more. We will examine two outcomes, the
number of firms and their profits. The data are aggregated to the county and year level and
form an unbalanced panel of counties. Figure 3 maps the counties for which we have firm
data.
The second additional data are village-level data for rural household incomes from the
National Fixed Point Survey (NFS) for the years 1987-1991, 1993, 1995-2005. There were
no surveys in 1992 and 94 for administrative reasons. The NFS is a longitudinal survey of
about 320 villages and 24,000 households distributed across all continental Chinese provinces
conducted by the research arm of the Ministry of Agriculture (RCRE). The villages were
chosen in 1987 to be nationally representative. There is very little attrition. To maintain
its representativeness, villages and households are added over time. Therefore, the panel of
villages is not perfectly balanced. For this study, we use household level data on income.
Each village contains on average 400 households and approximately a third of them are
surveyed by the NFS. The large number of households surveyed in each village means that we
20Beijing, Hebei, Jiangsu, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi,
Guizhou, Gansu, Qinghai, and Ningxia.
21These data are in principle available for other years. However, we only use the four years for which we
could geographically identify the location of the firm at the county level. This data has been recently used
by Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Banerjee et al. (2012). See these studies for a more detailed description of
the data.
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can examine the within village income distribution.22 Our income variable measures total net
income – i.e., the sum of household income (e.g., home production, agricultural production,
wages) minus the sum of production costs, excluding labor costs for home production and
agriculture. The data are aggregated to the county and year level. The RCRE provided us
with income for each decile of the village income distribution and the Gini coefficient for
the within village income distribution each year and did not provide us with average income
across all households. Therefore, in the analysis, we will focus on income of the 10th, 50th,
90th percentiles and the Gini coefficient. Figure 4 maps the counties for which we have
NFS data. Note that the exact location of these villages are confidential. Therefore, our
distance variables measure the distance from the centroid of the county that contains the
village to the object of interest. This introduces measurement error to the right-hand-side
of our estimates for household income that is most likely classical in nature.
For all samples, we exclude the autonomous regions of Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongo-
lia both because these provinces are predominantly non-Han ethnic minorities, faced different
policies, and because the railroads constructed in these regions were the results of very dif-
ferent imperatives. For the latter reason, we also excluded the three Manchurian provinces
of Heilongjiang, Liaoning and Jilin. The large cities that are on the segment termini are
also excluded to avoid the results being driven by the end-points, which are on the line and
were chosen because they were important to begin with. It is important to note that other
cities on the line (that are not the termini of line segments) are included in our sample so
that our estimates will capture any effects that transportation infrastructure may have on
the formation or growth of cities.
Table 1 describes the data. Panel A describes the sample with GDP data. On aver-
age, these counties are approximately 71 kilometers from the line and 39 kilometers from
railroads. The fact that the average distance to railroads is less than the average distance
to the line reflects the fact that we constructed many fewer lines than there are railroads
to only capture to major transportation networks and to avoid the problem of having too
22Villages and households are surveyed every year. The survey uses a stratified sampling approach. For
each province, it first randomly selects a number of counties, and then randomly selects a number of villages
within each county. Households are then randomly selected from each village. See Martinez-Bravo et al.
(2010) for a description of these data.
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many lines that we discussed earlier. During our study period, there are very few highways
with median dividers in China. On average, a county has only approximately six kilometers
of divided highways. Most motor traffic occurred on paved motor roads without dividers.
An average county has approximately 84 kilometers of such undivided paved roads. The
average county is far from a navigable river, the coastline and the country border.
Note that the data show significant variation in access to transportation infrastructure.
This alleviates any concerns that our study cannot detect significant marginal effects of
access because high levels of infrastructure investment by the Chinese government causes
there to be too little variation in access.
The average population of a county is approximately 201,347. Per capita GDP is 6,834
RMB. The nominal GDP reported in the statistical yearbooks are adjusted by the national
CPI. GDP from primary, secondary and tertiary sectors are roughly similar in size. Average
per capita GDP growth is 8% in this sample, which is similar to the national average
during the study period. Most of the income growth comes from the secondary and tertiary
sectors. Note that the number of observations differ across the GDP variables because not
every county is engaged in economic activity in every sector.
Panel B displays the descriptive statistics for the sample of household income data. For
the sake of brevity, we focus our discussion on the economic variables. The average within-
village Gini coefficient is 0.28. The net household income for the median household is on
average 5,460 RMB (constant), which is almost twice as much as the income of the 10th
percentile household and approximately half of the income of the 90th percentile. Inequality
is growing over time. The Gini coefficient increases by 0.001 per year on average. This
is driven by higher income growth rate for richer households, although the level of income
increases across all parts of the income distribution.
Since there are approximately three people per household in these data, the household
income here implies a slightly lower income than the per capita GDP from the sample in
panel A. This is not surprising since the earlier sample includes urban and rural areas, while
the household income data in panel B only includes rural households, which are on average
poorer than urban households. Similarly, income growth is slower in rural areas. Recall
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that there are no data for 1992 and 94. Therefore, we interpolate the annual growth rates
between 1991 and 93, and 1993 and 95 as the growth rates for each two-year interval divided
by two.
Panel C describes the firm data. Again, for the sake of brevity, we focus on the economic
variables. On average, there are 82 manufacturing firms in a county. For interest, we
divide these firms into three ownership types: firms owned by the state, firms of mixed
ownership and firms owned by private individuals. State-owned firms are directly controlled
by the state. Mixed-ownership firms are typically privatized state firms for which the state
owns most of the equity. Individually owned firms are truly private enterprises that have
little connection to the state. The data show that most firms are owned by the state and
individuals. There are only a few firms that are owned by a mix of state and private parties.
Next, we describe the data on firm profits. These only report profits on counties with at
least one firm. Therefore, the number of observations will differ across variables because
not every county has a manufacturing firm of a particular type. The high level of reported
profits is consistent with the fact that these data sample large firms (more than five million
in market capitalization).
Table 2 shows the outcome variables of interest for different distances to the line. These
data show that most of the economic measures of interest decline with distance from the line.
Most importantly, we do not observe systematic upticks in these measures as we approach
the furthest deciles, which is reassuring for the concern that distance from our line bring a
count towards another transportation network.
6 Results
6.1 Lines, Railroads and Transportation Networks
Table 3 shows the estimates of the correlation between the distance to the nearest trans-
portation infrastructure and the distance to our constructed lines based on equation (7).
Distance is measured in terms of kilometers. Panel A shows that distance from the histor-
ical lines are positively correlated with distances from railroads, the coastline and segment
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cities, and the length of paved roads; negatively correlated with the distance to the country
border and the length of highways within a county; and uncorrelated with whether a county
is on the coast line or near a navigable river. The correlations shown in Panels B and C will
be discussed later in this section.
6.2 The Effect of Distance from the Line on GDP
To illustrate the effects of our baseline controls, we first estimate the effects of distance
to the line on the log of GDP per capita. In Table 4, we begin with a specification that
only controls for province and year fixed effects (see column (1)). In columns (2)-(7), we
gradually introduce the baseline controls. The distances to the segment city controls for the
effect of proximity to a large urban terminus. The distances to the nearest navigable river
and coastline control for access to traditional methods of transportation that existed before
the lines of interest were constructed. The lengths of highways and roads, and total county
area, control for the density of motorways that were constructed long after the lines of
interest. Controlling for the distance to the country border addresses the possible influences
of a “border” effect.23 Finally, the control for the distance to the coastline also addresses
the fact that during the period of our study, economic conditions diverged greatly between
the coastal areas and the interior areas. Without this control, one could be concerned that
a positive correlation between economic outcomes and distance to our lines is an outcome
of faster growth in the coastal areas, which may also be coincidentally closer to our lines
on average. In addition to controlling for the log of the linear measure of these distance
measures, we also control for the quadratic terms to capture the idea that the costs of
distance from transportation may be diminishing over distance (e.g., there maybe increasing
returns to profit).
The estimates show that the coefficient for the log distance to the historical line and
its standard error are very stable across specifications. The full baseline specification from
equation (8) is shown in column (8). It is statistically significant at the 1% level. It shows
that the elasticity between the distance to the line and per capita GDP is -0.0672. Note
23For example, see Feenstra (2002) and the studies referenced there within.
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that because the data indicate that the relationship between the distance from historical
lines and per capita GDP is log-linear, our main specification in column (8) does not control
for the quadratic of the distance from the line.
One way to assess the magnitude of our results is to benchmark our estimates of the
effect of distance on GDP across space to the total increase of GDP over time in our sample.
In our sample, the 75th-percentile county in terms of distance is 3.8 times further away from
line than the 25th-percentile county. Our estimates imply that distance will cause the 75th-
percentile county to have almost nineteen percent (−0.0672×2.8 = −0.188) lower per capita
GDP. During the eighteen years covered by our data, per capita GDP in our sample grew
from approximately 2,744 to 9,916 RMB (e.g., the annual growth rate was approximately
7.5 percent), which is approximately a 242% increase. Therefore, a comparison of the effect
of distance across space to the increase in GDP over time suggests that the spatial difference
attributable to distance from the line is relatively moderate in size.
For the remaining results, we will show only the baseline specification for the sake of
brevity. All regressions will control for the full set of baseline controls shown in column (8)
of Table 4: the distances to segment cities, the nearest navigable river, the coastline and
the country border; the length of highways and paved roads within a county; the total area
of the county; the squared terms of each of the aforementioned variables; and province and
year fixed effects. As with the results in Table 4, the estimated coefficients for the distance
from the line are very similar with different combinations of controls.24
In Table 5, we examine per capita GDP and annual growth in per capita GDP by sector.
We estimate the reduced form effect of the distance to the line from equation (7). The
estimates for the full sample are shown in Panel A. Columns (1)-(4) show that distance to the
line is negatively correlated with GDP levels across sectors. The estimates are statistically
significant at the 1% level for per capita GDP in all sectors and tertiary sectors, and at
the 10% level for secondary sectors. To interpret the magnitude of the coefficient, consider
the estimate in column (1). It shows that the elasticity of per capita GDP with respect to
distance from the line is -0.0672. In other words, a 1% increase in distance from the line
24These results are available upon request.
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results in a 0.07% reduction in per capita GDP.
Columns (5)-(8) show the estimates of the effect of distance from the line on per capita
GDP growth. We calculate per capita GDP growth as the difference between log per capita
GDP growth next year and this year for each county, ln(pcgdpc,t+1)−ln(pcgdpc,t). To control
for the possibility that poorer regions may experience different rates of growth relative
to rich regions for reasons that are independent of access to infrastructure (i.e. income
may be mean-reverting), we control for two lags of the level measures of the dependent
variable: ln(pcgdpc,t−1) and ln(pcgdpc,t−2).25 The estimates are statistically insignificant
for all sectors. They are also very small in magnitude, especially when we consider that
the mean growth rate in our sample is 4-8% percent per year, depending on the sector.
Therefore, we conclude that we find a precisely estimated zero effect the distance from the
line on GDP per capita growth.26
Another way to assess the magnitude of the estimates is to make the extreme assumption
that being near the line benefits production only through a region’s access to railroads.
Under this extreme assumption, we can estimate the upper-bound of the effect of the distance
from railroads by dividing our main estimates by the estimated correlation between distance
to the line and distance to the railroad (e.g., equation (8) with the dependent variable being
the log of distance to railroads). This estimate is 0.133 (the standard error is 0.0628), which
25To check that our results are not driven by the particular lag structure of the controls, we alternatively
control for 3, 4 or 5 year moving averages of lag per capita GDP. Our results are robust and we find no effect
of distance to the line on growth. The estimated coefficients are similarly small in magnitude and statistically
insignificant. The sample size becomes smaller as we introduce longer lags and the estimates become more
imprecise. These estimates are not shown for the sake of brevity, but are available upon request. Note that
one could alternatively control for per capita GDP in the first year of the panel. We do not do this because
the unbalanced nature of our panel means that we would lose too many observations.
26Note that the estimates above avoid the Nickell (1981) bias as we do not control for lag growth. To check
that our results are not driven by this choice of specification, we also estimate the growth regression using the
more traditional method of the Arrellano-Bond System Dynamic Panel Estimation, where we control for the
lag of per capita growth rate. The lags of the level measures are now used as instruments for lag growth rates
rather than controls in the second stage equation. The system GMM estimator uses the levels equation from
the standard Arrellano-Bond estimate to obtain a system of two equations: one differenced and one in levels.
The variables in levels in the second equation are instrumented with their own first differences. This method
has the advantage over the standard Arrellano-Bond Estimate that it typically increases efficiency. Like the
standard estimate, it assumes that the lags of the level measures of the growth variable are exogenous to the
error term. And it has the additional assumption that the first-differenced instruments used for the variables
in levels are also uncorrelated with the unobserved county effects. For references, see Arellano and Bond
(1991) and Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) for more discussion. The estimates are presented in Appendix Table
A.1 panel A. The estimates are mall in magnitude and statistically insignificant. Thus, they are consistent
with our main estimates that distance from the lines have little effect on growth.
27
means that conditional on all of the baseline controls, doubling a county’s distance from
the line increases the distance to the nearest railroad by approximately thirteen percent.
Dividing the estimate in Table 5 panel A column (1) by 0.133, we calculate that the maximum
elasticity of per capita GDP with respect to the distance to the line is 0.5 for all GDP.
Dividing the estimate in column (5) by 0.133, we calculate that the maximum elasticity
of growth with respect to distance is -0.0156. As pointed out earlier, the distance to the
line is not an excludable instrument for the distance to the railroads because it is also
correlated with other forms of transportation infrastructure. However, by interpreting these
two-stage calculations as the upper-bound effects of railroads, we can starkly illustrate the
small magnitude of the effect (e.g. zero effect) of access to transportation on per capita
growth relative to the effect on the level differences in per capita GDP.
One potential issue for interpreting for our finding that per capita GDP levels are higher
in regions near the line is the possibility of displacement. For example, the placement of
transportation may cause a “crowding-in” effect such that firms re-locate to be near the line.
This could cause proximity to the line to be positively correlated with production even if the
investment in having a line does not increase aggregate (provincial or national) production
from when there is no line. To investigate this issue, we repeat the estimation on a sample
where the 10% nearest counties are excluded, and then again on samples where the 20%
are excluded. If the full sample results are caused by productive firms relocating to be very
near the railroad, then the estimated effect should decrease in magnitude when we omit
those groups (since one would expect firms that choose to relocate to be close to the line to
relocate as close as possible to the line).
Table 5 panels B and C provide little support for the crowding-in hypothesizes. For
example, a comparison of the estimates in columns (1)-(4) between the full sample estimates
in panel A to panel C, where the 20% nearest counties are omitted shows that per capita
GDP is, if anything, slightly larger in magnitude as we move further away from the line. As
with the full sample, we find no effect on per capita GDP growth.
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6.3 The Effect on Firms Placement and Household Income
Table 6 shows the estimated effects of the distance from the line on the number and average
profits of manufacturing firms. Panel A shows the estimates for the full sample. Columns
(1)-(4) show that distance from the line results in fewer firms. The estimates are statistically
significant at the 1% level for all firm ownership types. The coefficient in column (1) indicates
that increasing the distance by 1% will result in a 0.08% reduction in the number of firms.
In columns (5)-(8), we examine log average firm profits. The estimates show that amongst
counties that have at least one firm (of the relevant type), distance results in lower profits.
The estimates are statistically significant for all firms and publicly owned firms at the 1%
and 5% levels. Column (5) shows that a 1% increase in distance results in a 0.1% reduction
in average firm profits.
As with our earlier exercise, we assess the magnitude of our estimates by comparing
our estimates of the effect of distance on the number of firms across space to the total
increase in the number of firms over time. Since the 75th-percentile county in terms of
distance from the line is approximately 4.68 times further away than the 25th-percentile
county, our estimate in column (1) implies that it should have approximately thirty percent
fewer firms (−0.084 × 3.68 = −0.309). During the three years for which our data uses a
consistent sample frame (2004-06), the average number of firms per county grew by twelve
percent from approximately 83 to 93 firms per county.27 Relative to the change over time,
our cross-sectional estimate implies a high elasticity between distance and the number of
firms. However, this is partly an artifact of the short time horizon the firm panel data. For
example, if the number of firms had grown at the same rate (approximately five percent per
year) for eighteen years (which is the sample length of our GDP data), then the number
of firms would have grown by approximately 130% from approximately forty to 91 firms
per county. Relative to this cumulative growth over the longer time horizon, the implied
elasticity between the number of firms and distance to the line appear more moderate.
Repeating the same calculation for average firm profits, the estimate in column (5)
27Recall that the 1993 firm data is from a census of all industrial plants and has a different sampling
frame relative to the Census of Manufacturing firms which samples all firms with 5 million RMB or more
in market capitalization.
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implies that firms in the 75th-percentile county in terms of distance from the line should
have approximately 38% lower profits than firms in the 25th-percentile county on average
(−0.102 × 3.68 = −0.375). In contrast, average firm profits grew at approximately sixty
percent per year during 2004-6. If this was sustained for eighteen years, the cumulative
growth in firm profits would be 2,950%. While firm profits did not grow until the later reform
era and this crude estimate of cumulative profit growth is likely to be significantly higher
than actual firm profit growth over the eighteen year period, it nevertheless illustrates the
fact that the implied elasticities between distance from the line and firm profits is relatively
small in size.
In panels B and C, we repeat the estimates on samples where the nearest 10% and 20%
counties to the line are excluded. The estimates are similar to the main sample estimates.
This means that our finding that more firms locate nearer the line is unlikely to reflect a
crowding-in effect.
We also examined the effect of distance on the growth of the number of firms, the growth
of average firm profits and the returns to capital as measured by profits divided by the
value of total capital. These estimates were negative, small in magnitude and statistically
insignificant. We do not report them in the paper for the sake of brevity and because of
concerns over the quality of the data for returns to capital. Specifically, it is unclear how
capital is valued by these firms. Much of the capital is inherited from the state or collectives
and one would only know the market value if she observed the market transaction of another
similar piece of capital. If further away regions have fewer market transactions such that
firms there are more likely to under-value the capital, then our estimate of the returns to
capital will systematically over-state the effect of the line as we move further away from the
line. This measurement issue is a generic problem in the Chinese data on firm assets.
Table 7 shows the estimated effects of distance on average household income for agri-
cultural households at the village level. Panel A column (1) shows that distance from the
line is negatively correlated with the Gini coefficient for village household incomes. The
estimate is statistically significant at the 1% level. This is consistent with the finding that
distance from the line is positively correlated with the incomes of the median household, but
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negatively correlated with incomes of the poorest and richest households. However, these
estimates are not statistically significant.
In Column (5), we estimate the effect of distance on the annual change of the Gini
coefficient. It shows that distance from the line is correlated with slower growth in inequality.
The estimate is statistically significant at the 1% level. The estimated effects on income
growth are statistically indistinguishable from zero.28
In panels B and C, we present the results for restricted samples where we omit 10% and
20% closest counties to the line. The estimates show that the effect on household income
inequality is mainly driven by the nearest counties. This might reflect that these areas are
the ones that both gain the most in terms of trade opportunities, but also lose most from
capital (and, though it is not in our model, human capital) mobility.
6.4 Robustness to Additional Lines
One obvious concern with our strategy regards the relevance of our historical lines. Earlier in
this section, we showed that proximity to our lines is positively correlated with proximity to
transportation infrastructure such as railroads and coastal routes. However, our estimates
also suggested that our lines are uncorrelated with the more recently constructed paved
motorways, which have been found by a working paper by Faber (2009) to also affect pro-
duction and growth. In this section, we test that our main results are robust to controlling
for access to such recent transportation infrastructure. Specifically, we directly control for
distance to the expanded set of lines constructed by Faber (2009), which he kindly shared
with us. This expanded set of lines includes our historical lines of transportation and adds
many additional lines to capture recently constructed road networks.
First, we investigate the difference between the historical and expanded lines in terms of
how each correlates to transportation networks. Table 3 Panel B shows that on average, the
distance from the expanded set of lines is positively correlated to distance from railroads and
the distance from the segment city; negatively correlated with the length of highways and
28Arrellano-Bond estimates are presented in Appendix Table A.1 panel B. They are consistent with the
main results in showing that distance from the line has little effect on income growth. The estimates are
small in magnitude and statistically insignificant.
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roads; and uncorrelated with distance from rivers, coastline and country borders. Therefore
the key difference between the expanded set of lines and our historical lines is that the
distance to the former are negatively correlated with road density (recall that we control
for county area), while the distance to the latter are uncorrelated with road density. This
is consistent with the fact that the new lines capture new road networks built away from
the railroads. In Panel C, we examine the correlations of our historical and expanded set
of lines with transportation infrastructure in one regression. The correlation between our
historical lines and transportation infrastructure are robust to controlling for the additional
lines.
In Table 8, we test the robustness our main estimates by running a “horse race” between
the historical and expanded sets of lines. Note that the sample size is smaller than the one for
our main estimates because Faber’s, (2009) data do not match exactly to ours. Nevertheless,
our baseline estimates from using this restricted sample are similar to those from using our
full sample. More importantly, the estimates show that our baseline estimates of the effect
of historical lines are very robust to controlling for the additional lines. These estimates
suggest that the historical lines are indeed the relevant lines to study in our context.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the effects of having access to transportation infrastructure
during the two decades after China opened up to trade and market reforms, when it experi-
enced rapid GDP growth. We find that regions closer to historical transportation networks
have higher levels of GDP per capita, higher income inequality, a higher number of firms
and higher average firm profits. However, these level differences are relatively small in mag-
nitude and we find no evidence that distance affected income growth during the two decades
of rapid economic growth after China opened up its economy to trade and market reforms.
Our results do not contradict the Fogelian (Fogel, 1992, 1964) interpretation or Huang’s
(2008) view that during this period of fast growth, the Chinese government should not have
focused so much on building transportation infrastructure. However, they are also consistent
32
with an alternative explanation where the infrastructure might have brought sizeable benefits
for the economy as a whole, but the localization of the gains (and the overall level of the
gains) was limited by the lack of factor mobility. The fact that we do not see a strong
divergence between well- and poorly connected areas does not rule out the possibility that
infrastructure had benefits for all of them, but the lack of factor mobility prevented the
gains from being concentrated in relatively better connected areas.
These results should not discourage those who believe that investment in transportation
infrastructure can promote economic development. Rather, they highlight the importance of
other factors in thinking of the effects of infrastructure on growth. Moreover, as we noted in
the introduction of this paper, without knowing the returns of such investment, one cannot
say whether investments in transportation infrastructure ought to be made. Finding credible
ways to estimate or even bound the social returns remains a very important next step in
this research agenda.
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Table 4: The Effect of Distance to the Line on Production Levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln Distance to Historical Lines -0.0617 -0.0434 -0.0491 -0.0474 -0.0430 -0.0576 -0.0697 -0.0672
(0.0286) (0.0281) (0.0277) (0.0279) (0.0277) (0.0269) (0.0274) (0.0275)
Ln Distance to Segment City 0.0651 -0.0611 -0.0620 -0.0916 -0.0559 -0.184 -0.225
(0.232) (0.266) (0.264) (0.276) (0.276) (0.322) (0.293)
Ln Distance to Segment City2 -0.0276 -0.00886 -0.00727 -0.00469 -0.00585 0.00941 0.0131
(0.0277) (0.0308) (0.0309) (0.0323) (0.0320) (0.0371) (0.0340)
Ln Distance to Navigable River 0.318 0.305 0.316 0.307 0.362 0.380
(0.153) (0.156) (0.150) (0.144) (0.144) (0.141)
Ln Distance to Navigable River2 -0.0517 -0.0503 -0.0503 -0.0465 -0.0547 -0.0549
(0.0200) (0.0205) (0.0198) (0.0190) (0.0194) (0.0188)
Ln Length of Highway 0.00634 -0.0133 -0.0240 -0.0280 -0.0953
(0.146) (0.140) (0.131) (0.135) (0.131)
Ln Length of Highway2 0.00329 0.0111 0.0123 0.0121 0.0298
(0.0410) (0.0393) (0.0374) (0.0384) (0.0371)
Ln Length of Road 0.121 0.0921 0.116 0.0973
(0.109) (0.112) (0.104) (0.103)
Ln Length of Road2 -0.0252 -0.00799 -0.0113 -0.00789
(0.0174) (0.0171) (0.0163) (0.0160)
Ln Area -1.583 -1.464 -1.436
(0.699) (0.663) (0.666)
Ln Area2 0.0973 0.0910 0.0867
(0.0504) (0.0483) (0.0484)
Ln Distance to Coastline -0.216 -0.178
(0.223) (0.214)
Ln Distance to Coastline2 0.0132 0.0104
(0.0263) (0.0254)
Ln Distance to Country Border -16.99
(6.201)
Ln Distance to Country Border2 1.279
(0.468)
Observations 2744 2744 2744 2744 2744 2744 2744 2744
R-squared 0.818 0.826 0.833 0.833 0.835 0.847 0.850 0.853
Dependent Variable: Ln Per Capita GDP
Notes: All regressions control for year and province fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. 
These estimates use an unbalanced county-year level panel. GDP data are from Provincial Statistical Yearbooks. All 
geographic variables are computed by the authors.
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Table 8: Historical Lines and More Lines
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln PC GDP Ln PC GDP Primary Ln PC GDP Secondary Ln PC GDP Tertiary
Ln Distance to Hist Line -0.0788 -0.0278 -0.120 -0.0873
(0.0279) (0.0225) (0.0464) (0.0335)
Observations 2605 2142 2142 2096
R-squared 0.862 0.862 0.745 0.849
Ln Distance to Hist Line -0.0792 -0.0277 -0.121 -0.0880
(0.0282) (0.0225) (0.0471) (0.0341)
Ln Distance to Expanded Lines -0.0224 0.0112 -0.0495 -0.0433
(0.0324) (0.0294) (0.0479) (0.0424)
Observations 2605 2142 2142 2096
R-squared 0.862 0.862 0.746 0.850
Gini Ln Inc 10th Ln Inc 50th Ln Inc 90th
Ln Distance to Hist Line -0.00620 0.0337 0.0396 0.0370
(0.00364) (0.0286) (0.0267) (0.0322)
Observations 1070 1070 1070 1070
R-squared 0.329 0.560 0.612 0.568
Ln Distance to Hist Line -0.00712 0.0390 0.0433 0.0428
(0.00402) (0.0328) (0.0304) (0.0352)
Ln Distance to Expanded Lines -0.00429 0.0248 0.0173 0.0273
(0.00599) (0.0456) (0.0405) (0.0444)
Observations 1070 1070 1070 1070
R-squared 0.331 0.561 0.613 0.569
Ln Total # Firms Ln # Public Firms Ln # Mixed Firms Ln # Individual Firms
Ln Distance to Hist Line -0.094 -0.064 -0.074 -0.141
(0.025) (0.030) (0.039) (0.037)
Observations 2704 2704 2704 2704
R-squared 0.677 0.644 0.702 0.776
Ln Distance to Hist Line -0.094 -0.064 -0.074 -0.142
(0.025) (0.030) (0.039) (0.037)
Ln Distance to Expanded Lines -0.013 -0.002 0.007 0.037
(0.026) (0.035) (0.040) (0.045)
Observations 2704 2704 2704 2704
R-squared 0.677 0.644 0.702 0.776
Dependent Variables
Notes: All regressions control for the full set of baseline controls in Table 4 column (8). Standard errors are clustered at the county 
level. The sample is an unbalanced county-year level panel. The GDP data used in panels A-B are from Provincial Statistical 
Yearbooks. The income data used in Panels C-D are from the National Fixed Point Surveys. The firm data used in panels E-F are 
from the Censuses of Manufacturing Firms. The distance to the historical line is calculated by the authors. The distance to the 
expanded set of lines is taken from Farber (2009).
A. Baseline
B. Control for Expanded Lines
C. Baseline
D. Control for Expanded Lines
E. Baseline
F. Control for Expanded Lines
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Figure 1: Lines and Transportation Infrastructure
46
Figure 2: Counties with GDP data from the Provincial Statistical Yearbooks
47
Figure 3: Counties with Firm data from the Censuses for Manufacturing Firms
48
Figure 4: Counties with Income data from the National Fixed Point Survey
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